JOHANN GOTTFRIED HERDER AND WILLIAM JAMES: ASPECTS OF ANTICIPATORY THINKING

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ABSTRACT

The revival in Germany of Herder's legacy over the past three decades has been energized by an expansion and intensification of his reception in North America. Born a century apart and spending their lives in very different worlds, Herder and William James are unlikely candidates to support a thesis of direct influence. Nevertheless, there are intriguing correspondences pertaining to cognition, truth, the relation of thought and feeling, the body/mind dichotomy, and other issues that invite scrutiny. There are also some biographical indicators that suggest a measure of familiarity with Herder's life and works on the part of James. A close reading of some of their writings on religion conveys striking affinities.

This paper reflects an initial effort by someone long involved with Herder to become acquainted with James. Originally addressing an audience of Herder scholars, the paper was revised and expanded to utilize aspects of recent James studies. Though the case for direct influence could not be made, there are Jamesian formulations that echo Herderian views. Looked at in tandem, Herder and James reinforce current efforts by researchers to clarify the interaction of thought and feeling in the quest for truth. What are redundancies to specialists on one side may facilitate discoveries on the other.

Writing in 1830, John James Tayler (1797-1869), one of the earliest and most perceptive advocates of Herder’s thought in the English-speaking world, addressed the issue of originality and influence:

Where there is a free interchange of ideas amongst men, a floating atmosphere of thought is set in action, the result of a thousand casual and mingling contributions, which exerts such an effect on every individual mind subjected to its influence, as
renders it extremely difficult to decide, in regard to many of our most important views and opinions, what is original and what is borrowed. Truth, however, is every man’s property; and whatever an individual deeply feels and sincerely believes, is his own, wherever it may have originated.¹

Tayler’s “advertisement” is pertinent to this essay on Herder as a forerunner of William James not only because it raises the perennial issue of originality in reception history, but because it takes a position on truth that mattered greatly to both Herder and James. After an introduction to some general characteristics and major themes that invite the suggestion of kinship between Herder and James, a brief exploration of James’s familiarity with German thought and letters will lead to the topic of religion that governs this conference and to some concluding reflections.

A century and worlds apart in many ways, Herder and James nevertheless shared some striking characteristics: Both were at odds with some of the major intellectual trends of their day pertaining especially to the limits and ends of human cognition in the quest for truth. Both struggled with and stressed the close relation of thought and feeling. Both opposed dualistic thinking—the body/mind dichotomy—and, on the other hand, monistic absolutism. Both were scrupulous adherents of the scientific method who nevertheless had no scruples to affirm the existence of the intangibles. Both embraced the need for popular phrasings in the face of academic obscurities. Both wrestled with the meaning of the self and self-formation. Both had a powerful and lasting, to this day not fully acknowledged, impact on their respective posterities.

Herder’s concept of truth was discussed at this meeting by Rainer Godel. Godel’s careful analysis of the elements underlying Herder’s conception of truth, rendering it as a process rather than of logical permanence, struck this listener immediately upon hearing it at the conference as a “reverse echo” of what James has to say on the subject in his Pragmatism and in The Meaning of Truth.² Godel finds “Herder’s use of the term ‘truth,’ [...] strongly related with the anthropological conditions human beings underlie even when attempting to find the truth.” Godel’s discussion of these conditions confirms to the reader of James’s works the initial impression of an enduring kinship between the two men (Godel 2011, 4). This kinship becomes apparent especially in Chapter III of The Meaning of Truth, “Humanism and Truth” (James 1987,
When James here says that “[...] in our ordinary life the mental terms are images and the real ones are sensations [...]” (871), he touches on Godel’s discussion of “imagined/poetic truth,” with its reference to Herder’s discussion of the truth and vivacity of images as they convey their pregnancy and clarity (Godel 2011, 8-9). When James concluded that “Truth here is a relation, not of our ideas to non-human relations, but of conceptual parts of our experience to sensational parts” (871), he anticipated a subject of discussion much present in contemporary Herder scholarship. Of particular interest here is the recent Gaier/Simon volume entitled *Between Image and Concept: Kant and Herder on the Schema.*

The fundamental formulation of the questions posed by the editors, when reduced to catchwords, presents Kant as asking “how does one render categories perceptual?”, while Herder would ask “how does one conceptualize images?” (Gaier/Simon 2010, 9). Although the editors proclaim the perennial conflict between Kant and Herder unsolvable (11), their focus on the schema and the recruitment of contributors with quite divergent views results in an impressive advancement of a heretofore stifled discourse and a notable refinement of highly relevant issues. The fact that, to some contributors, Kant and Herder were closer to one another than indicated by the polemical tone of their discourse, will set new directions for commentators. With respect to this essay the contribution of Hans Adler is of particular relevance. Entitled “Metaschema und Aisthese. Herders Gegenentwurf zu Kant” (Gaier/Simon 2010, 119-154), Adler’s thoughtful “counterdesign” to Kant’s unyielding dominance carefully reviews the initial commonalities between the two men as well as the major contentious issues that marked the prolonged controversy. For the purpose of substantiating my thesis of a kinship between Herder and William James, Adler’s section entitled “Metaphor Research and ‘Embodied Truth’” (“Metaphernforschung und ‘leibhafte Wahrheit’”) (152-154, 152) is especially helpful. Citing the work of George Lakoff and Mark Johnson on “[...] the embodied origins of human meaning and thought,” Adler provided me with a reference to the William James whom I introduced earlier as characterized by his opposition to the body/mind dichotomy (Adler 2010, 152). Adler’s compact summary and meticulous documentation of Johnson’s proposed “general theory of embodied cognition” undeviatingly culminates in a quite justified complaint about the complete neglect in this “indeed productive research” of Herder as a “compatible forerunner” (153). In the 2005 essay, Johnson presents Kant’s effort to use the “schema” as “[...] a connecting link, a ‘third thing,’ that would bind the concept, which he
thought of as *formal* to the *matter* of sensation” (Johnson 2005, 2). Johnson concludes that “The chief problem with Kant’s account is that it is based on an absolute dichotomy between form and matter” (3). Johnson reminds us that “James even went so far as to claim that we ‘feel’ logical relations, such as those indicated by *if* ... *then*, *and*, and *but*. The “but” was to appear again in the title of the James chapter of Johnson’s 2007 volume. Concluding the earlier article, Johnson observed that “[...] James never succeeded in convincing people to take seriously the role of feeling in thought,” and that “Only now, a century or more later, are cognitive neuro-scientists returning to some of James’s insights about the quality of thought and the role of emotion in reasoning” (Johnson 2005, 18-20, 19). Johnson was surprised when he was informed by this writer that –yet more than one century earlier– Herder had brought upon himself the undying wrath of Kant for stating views on thought and feeling, and on the mind/body dichotomy, remarkably anticipatory of James. In the chapter “Feeling William James’s ‘But’. The Aesthetics of Reasoning and Logic,” Mark Johnson forcefully reiterates the points made regarding the role of feeling in the process of thinking made in the 2005 essay. He then traces the significance of words such as “but” in human speech back to James’s *The Principles of Psychology* (1890), where James initially had made the case for the part of feelings in logical thought (Johnson 2007, 94-98). Most notably Johnson then relates these passages to James’s late essays on “Percept and Concept,” posthumously published in *Some Problems of Philosophy* (James II, 997-1106, 1002-1039). He aptly sums up his reasons for including a chapter on James in his challenging volume:

In his amazing two-volume work *The Principles of Psychology* (1890) and in his later essay “Percept and Concept” (1911), William James explored a way to conceive of concepts without succumbing to the dualistic ways of thinking that underlie the objectivist way of cognition. The key, he realized, was not to fall into the dualistic trap of thinking of percepts and concepts as different in kind and to see them, rather as two aspects of a continuous flow of feeling-thinking” (Johnson 2007, 87).

For the reader familiar with Herder’s views on these issues, confirmed by recent scholarship, the similarities are indeed striking.
For a neophyte in the world of William James whose entry was eased by the standard works of Perry, Myers, Richardson, et al., especially the splendid *Cambridge Companion*, the discovery of Francesca Bordogna’s important addition to the literature has been a major find.⁶ Considered by Eugene Taylor “[...], the single most important contribution to James scholarship since John McDermott and Charlene Haddock Seigfried identified radical empiricism as the core of James’s metaphysics,” Bordogna inadvertently provides significant support for the suggestion that the themes sketched above indicate a Herder/James kinship.⁷

By placing her discussion of James’s account of truth into the context of human feelings, cognition, and volition, and by suggesting “[...], but also a physiology of truth,” Bordogna’s chapter on “Mental Boundaries and Pragmatic Truth” (4, 137-153,) in effect leads to a reconsideration of the Herderian position sketched above. Her review of Hilary Putnam’s “four central components in James’s account of truth” solidified for this reader that the Jamesian notion of truth as process was also central to Herder’s approach (139-141).⁸ But Bordogna goes beyond Putnam by pursuing James’s “central [...], contention that not only interests but also emotions, volitions and purposes could play an important role in the production of truth [...]” (141-144). Bordogna’s sub-section entitled “Embodied Truth” addresses the issues raised by Hans Adler in the Gaier/Simon volume and by Mark Johnson in his various writings cited above. By making clear that James’s contemporaries found his “blurring” of “[...], the divide that separated the intellect from the body [...] unacceptable” (145), and that critics objected to his “[...] embodying truth in the psychological and physiological workings of the knower” as denigrating the dignity of both the philosopher and the notion of ‘truth,’” Bordogna evokes echoes of the unending Herder/Kant dispute. Quite intriguing in this section is Bordogna’s claim that “James, however, extended the motor view to all ideas and made it into the cornerstone of his conception of the will (147; James 1992, 386-426, esp. 420-426). In his pioneering essay on “Luther in Herder’s Labors,” Güнтер Arnold has demonstrated the ambiguous evolution of the Lutheran preacher beholden to the “bonded will” into an advocate of its freedom. Arnold’s profound early essay and Martin Keßler’s unprecedented, elaborate and thorough examination of Herder’s professional life will be major sources for a much needed study of Herder’s views on the subject.⁹ Arnold’s observation of Herder’s endeavor to grasp “the totality of the human being as the unity of all his inherent powers and contradictions” [“Die
Totalität des Menschen als Einheit seiner Wesenskraft und Widersprüche [...]” gives food for thought on a subject that here cannot be explored further (Arnold 1986, 251). Nevertheless, Bordogna’s probing discussion, in the section “The Psychology of Truth: Feeling, Cognition, and Volition,” of the interplay of these three faculties with reason in the quest for truth (148-153) merits also to be read in the context of Herder’s Ideen.¹⁰

For this writer, the most meaningful chapter of Bordogna’s book is the one dealing with the dimensions of the Self: “Ecstasy and Community. James and the Politics of the Self” (6, 189-217). Going far beyond the “Politics of the Self,” and stressing its divisions, possible unification, and ultimate meaning, Bordogna’s rich account touches in multiple ways on Herder’s abiding concern with the subject, including significant reference to Gustav Theodor Fechner, who will be discussed later (207-208). Herder’s most pertinent prose discussion of the subject, the 1781 essay “Liebe und Selbstheit” [“Love and Selfhood”], was available in the English translation of Frederic Henry Hedge since 1847.¹¹ Underlying much of Herder’s thought during his prime as well as in his later years, the subject of the Self was profoundly explored by him in two long didactic poems that became part of his Scattered Leaves in 1797.¹² Considered by many Herder scholars as reflecting some of his deepest aspirations and concerns, these poems together with the prose essays that surround them in the 6th edition of the Scattered Leaves complement what James had to say on the subject in Bordogna’s reading.

My initial proposition that James and Herder shared some characteristics and my discussion of significant themes inviting comparison raise the question whether James was in any way directly acquainted with Herder’s thought and works.

In the course of his multiple journeys to Europe over a lifetime William James visited Germany quite frequently and, as a young man, he had several extended stays there for study as well as to seek cures for his various ailments. His command of the language appears to have been proficient and his familiarity with German thought and letters was quite outstanding. Writing from Dresden to Arthur George Sedgwick on March 23, 1868, the then twenty-six year old convalescent presented an interesting early appraisal of Germany and its inhabitants, culminating in this observation: “[...]I know of no people to whose sense I would rather abandon a project or idea that lay near my heart [...]”¹³
In a letter of June 1, 1869 to his brother Henry, William listed a string of German writers, among them Herder, whose works he had read and he strongly encouraged Henry to learn the language, concluding that a stay there would bring significant rewards. Of particular interest here is young William James’s astounding familiarity with Goethe’s life and a wide range of his works, as his recent and most knowledgeable biographer observed (Richardson 2006, 91-92). Citing James’s letter to Tom Ward, Richardson gives his readers an early Jamesian take on Goethe that might as well have served as a reflection on Herder: “He thought Goethe ‘had a deep belief in the reality of Nature as she lies developed and a contempt for bodiless formulas. Through every individual fact he came in contact with the world, and he strove and fought without ceasing ever to lay his mind more and more wide open to Nature’s teaching’” (Richardson 2006, 91-92; James 1992-2004, 1995, 306-307).

For a historian seeking to establish the direct proximity of James to sources supporting the revival of Herder’s reputation in America during the 1870s, the work of Karl Hillebrand must once more be alluded to. Hillebrand’s three extensive articles on Herder in the North American Review of 1872/73 came to my attention during my work on the American Transcendentalists (Hillebrand 1872-1873). Looking at James’s correspondence I was much surprised to learn not only that both William and Henry James knew Hillebrand well over a long stretch of time and visited him in Florence at several occasions, but also that a review of Theophile Gautier by Henry James appeared alongside the third of Hillebrand’s Herder articles in the North American Review. The entire issue of the NAR in turn was then reviewed in The Nation, with elaborate references to the contributions by Henry James on Gautier and Karl Hillebrand on Herder. Substantial portions of Hillebrand’s Herder articles were incorporated in the six lectures on German thought given by Hillebrand in London in May and June of 1879 that were published in several editions in New York. Under the chapter heading “The Age of Herder (1770-1786),” Chapter III established the critical role Herder played in the shaping of German thought not only during these years, but also during the Classical and Romantic periods extending deep into the nineteenth century (Hillebrand 1880, 117-172). The contacts with Hillebrand reflected in the correspondence of the James brothers during the 1870s right up to his death in 1884 render it likely that they were aware of Hillebrand’s view of Herder. Alas, more may not be said at this
point about any direct influence of Herder’s “anticipatory thinking with any degree of certainty

Nevertheless, based on an awareness of William James’s exposure to German thought and letters discussed in the foregoing, a further focused reading of some of his writings, searching for direct or indirect influences, seemed to be called for. Read in the context of the currents of thought generated by his father and his Transcendentalist friends, such a reading reveals some of the sources that enabled James to face down the positivist challenges of the later nineteenth century. Ralph Barton Perry long ago has aptly sketched the outline:

James began his philosophical thinking about 1860, at a time when the enemies of science and religion were being mobilized for the war which lasted out the century, and in which James sought to be a mediator. How he adhered to the British empirical tradition, how he sought to liberalize this tradition and reconcile it with religion, and how he fought against its great adversary, Hegelianism, make up the theme of James’s early philosophical orientation.  

What in Perry’s 1936 account is described as “the theme of James’s early philosophical orientation” appears to some current observers as extending through his entire life. Examining James’s The Will to Believe, Richardson concluded that “[...], this volume is our best warrant for saying that James was always interested in psychology, religion, and philosophy, and that what we are sometimes tempted to regard as progression is simply the continual turning this way and that of a grand central concern that had all three facets for James (Richardson 2006, 361-365, 364). The theme of continuity from the generation of Henry James senior’s friends to the end of William James’s life is also confirmed by the conclusion of Philip Gura’s splendid new history of American Transcendentalism.

If psychology, religion, and philosophy then were the “three facets” of James’s “[...] grand central concern,” as he endeavored to be a mediator between “[...]{scientific agnosticism and the religious view of the world [...]},” he derived much sustenance in his struggle from German sources. For the purposes of this conference, on “Herder and Religion,” James’s The Will to Believe may be the most suitable of his works to conclude an examination with respect to
Herder as Vordenker. Based on talks to various student organizations, the ten essays making up the volume were written during the years from 1879 to 1896, demonstrating William’s sustained interest in the grand theme sketched above. In the “Preface” James was specific about his purpose: “The first four essays are,” he wrote, “largely concerned with defending the legitimacy of religious faith.” A reader of these essays who is also familiar with Herder’s writings on religion will find that quite a few of James’s concerns were anticipated by the German thinker at various points of his life.

Introducing his commentary on the last of Herder’s Christliche Schriften, Von Religion, Lehrmeinungen und Gebräuchen (1798), Christoph Bultmann has given us an instructive sketch of Herder’s lifelong occupation with the “Thema Religion.” Listing the writings on religion, beginning with the 1766 excerpts from Hume’s Natural History of Religion and including the most significant titles from the Bückeburg and Weimar periods, Bultmann demonstrates the continuity of Herder’s concern with religion while he was also working on a vast variety of other subjects. Bultmann concludes his introduction with a vital word of advice: “Es ist für die Herderinterpretation fruchtbar, gerade gattungsmäßig nicht zusammenhängende Werke auf ihre gemeinsamen Intentionen, Sachgegenstände und die Wechselbeziehungen in ihrer Genese zu befragen.” [“It is fruitful for Herder interpreters to examine especially the generically not connected works with respect to their common intentions, subject matter, and their effects on one another in their genesis”] (FA 9/1, 727-857, 1145-1146). But, again, it is Rudolf Haym who gives us the necessary details from the young Herder’s encounter with Hume to the powerful reiteration of his personal creed in the last of his Christliche Schriften, approaching the eve of his life.

How does Herder define religion here? Stressing “Naturreligion” [natural religion], “Menschen- und Völkerreligion” [human- and peoples’ religion], the “Religion der Erfahrung” [the religion of experience], based on the faith that “ought to be called ‘Religion der Menschheit’” [the religion of humanity], Herder defined his creed by proclaiming:

“[...]denn Religion ist, was unser Herz zwingend anspricht, unserer Triebe sich bemächtigt, Gesinnung erweckt und unser innigstes Bewußtsein bindet [...]. Nicht nach dem Christentum allein; nach des Menschen eigenster Natur ist seine
Religion keine andre als Menschlichkeit, wirksame Treue und Liebe. [...] for religion is what compellingly speaks to our heart, masters our instincts, arouses our sense of duty and binds our innermost consciousness [...]. Not in accord with Christendom alone, but in accord with the human being’s most intimate nature is his religion none other than humanity, active trust and love” (FA 9/1, 784, 785, 829).

Defending the legitimacy of religious faith in the first four essays of The Will to Believe, William James touches on several critical issues that were stressed by Herder in the last of his Christliche Schriften. In “The Sentiment of Rationality,” the earliest of the essays written in 1879-1880, James already presents a definition of religious faith, likening it to courage in practical affairs, reflecting the average man’s “power to trust” as an “essential function.” Very much like Herder he takes issue with scientists who deny the justification and efficacy of faith, concluding that “The only escape from faith is mental nullity [...]. We cannot live or think at all without some degree of hypothesis” (James 1992, 524-527). Fifteen years later, in the lead essay that gave the book its title, and in its sequence, “Is Life Worth Living?,” James has fortified his position. Resentful of a science that, preoccupied with the method of verification, has “[...] ceased to care for truth by itself at all,” he asserts that “[...]science would be far less advanced than she is if the passionate desires of individuals to get their own faiths confirmed had been kept out of the game” (James 1992, 471). But now, turning to the religious hypothesis, affirming “the more eternal things” as “the best things,” he assures his listeners that “the second affirmation of religion is that we are better off even now if we believe her first affirmation to be true” (James 1992, 474-475). By the time he wrote the last of the ten essays in 1896, “Is Life Worth Living?,” James was ready to proclaim, inveighing powerfully against the darkness of suicidal thoughts, “[...] that we have a right to believe the physical order to be only a partial order; that we have a right to supplement it by an unseen spiritual order which we assume on trust, if only thereby life may seem to us better worth living again” (James 1992, 495; Richardson 2006, 354-356). Composing the “Preface” to the volume in December of 1896, James had found in pluralism as “[...] the permanent form of the world” the basis for the “radical empiricism” of his final years that also accommodated his lectures on “the varieties of religious experience.”
A century earlier, also approaching the final years of his life, Herder had emphatically reiterated his conviction that faith was central to his universe. He did so not only in the last of his *Christliche Schriften* but also in the 6th Collection of the *Zerstreute Blätter.* Keeping in mind the time of the composition, 1796-1797, Rudolf Haym observed that the 6th Collection of the *Zerstreute Blätter* “[…] was itself a kind of Christliche Schrift (Haym 1885, 578). Aside from the two poems on the “mortal I” and the “immortal Self,” probing, in Haym’s words “[…] the deepest foundations of Herder’s faith and convictions […] (“[…]steigen in die tiefsten Gründe von Herders Glaubens- und Überzeugungsleben hinab […]”), the essays “On Knowing and Not-Knowing the Future” and “On Knowing, Divining, Desiring, Hoping and Believing” endorse the thrust of the final *Christliche Schrift* (Haym 1885, 578, 580-585). When Herder concluded Section V of *Von Religion* […] by proclaiming “[…] these veins of Christianity, *Faith, Love,* and *Hope,* and their root, genuine conscientiousness, as the only and immanent human religion […]” and finds, in the next Section dealing with religion and science, that all higher learning “[…] in the end must indeed harken back to religion, that is to an innermost human consciousness […],” he left a testimony to his own priorities. 

My own reading of Herder’s *Religionsschrift* and its echoes in the last issue of the *Zerstreute Blätter* as anticipating James’s eloquent defense of religious faith a century later finds support in Matthias Wolfes’s brilliant interpretation of Herder’s “free religiosity” (Wolfes 2005). William James concluded his *Varieties* by proclaiming that “[…] the total expression of human experience, as I view it objectively, invincibly urges me beyond the narrow ‘scientific’ bounds […]” and by asking “Who knows whether the faithfulness of individuals here below to their own poor over-beliefs may not actually help God in turn to be more effectively faithful to his own greater tasks?” (James 1987, 1-477, 463). Building up to this conclusion of his final and autobiographical Gifford Lecture, James moves on to a confession to his readers. He explains why he has “seemed so bent on rehabilitating the element of feeling in religion and subordinating its intellectual part” by concluding that “Individuality is founded in feeling;[…]”, a very Herderian formulation. Lack of time allows me only a brief comment on the man who, in my judgment, strongly influenced James’s religious views, Gustav Theodor Fechner.

James’s *A Pluralistic Universe*, the book that grew out of the May 1908 “Hibbert Lectures,” contains as “Lecture 4” an essay entitled “Concerning Fechner.” In the *Hibbert*
Journal the lecture still bears the fascinating title “The doctrine of the Earth-Soul and of Beings Intermediate Between Man and God.”²⁵ The Fechner celebrated in Lecture 4 of James’s A Pluralistic Universe, a year before his death, had been for him a source “[...]of long standing interest [...].” In 1836, thirty-five years old, Fechner had published his Das Büchlein vom Leben nach dem Tode, a book republished several times, translated into English in 1904 and supplied with a preface by William James, that had earned him much positivist contempt, as well as high praise from scholars such as Wilhelm Wundt.²⁶

In addition to Thomas Borgard’s pathbreaking 1999 dissertation, his essay on Lotze’s Herderrezeption and his paper on Poe, Lotze, and Herder prepared for this conference, substantiate my thesis of Herder’s role as a Vordenker of late-nineteenth-century currents of thought.²⁷

My own reading of Fechner’s “metaphysical” writings with respect to their impact on William James leaves me persuaded that the “personal” parts of his Varieties were significantly shaped by Fechner’s take on religion. Fechner’s Glaubenssätze (“Mandates of Faith”), concluding the Zend Avesta, read like a very Christian “Confession of Faith.” Their insistence in “Article 4” that “[...] in God’s Order of the World (Weltordnung) nothing unnatural and supernatural takes place” will have given James a boost, as he read the second edition of the book once more in 1905.²⁸ When I see in Fechner’s “Confession of Faith” an anticipation of James’s The Will to Believe, I am amused to know that, in 1994, even Herder was accused of practicing “the will to believe” when the sincerity of his work was questioned by a contemporary scholar.²⁹

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REFERENCES


**NOTES**

1Tayler 1830, “Advertisement,” iii-iv. I owe this citation to John Vivian, a participant at the 2010 Conference of the International Herder Society, at which this paper was presented. See also Vivian, 2008.

2James 1987, *Pragmatism*, 479-624, 572-590; *The Meaning of Truth*, 821-978, 857-880. Rainer Godel kindly made the draft of his conference paper available to me. I cite from his manuscript.


Bordogna 2008. Professor Bordogna’s thoughtful personal consultation was of inestimable value to my present effort.

Taylor 2009, 138-140, 138. Though one may not agree with Taylor’s view of Transcendentalism as “[...] the first uniquely American philosophy independent of European roots,” his critique of the “narrowing [...] intellectual and spiritual scope of modern American thought” and of Bordogna’s work as effectively counteracting this trend, is well taken (140).

Putnam 1997, 166-185. See also Lamberth 2009. Lamberth’s 2008 Presidential Address to the William James Society provided multiple contact points for the issues raised by Putnam and Bordogna. His extensive references to Hermann Lotze inadvertently facilitate my effort to link Herder and James.


To me now the French mind seems strangely monotonous—\textit{for form—je ne dis pas!} but for ideas I don’t feel as if I should ever find new ones in a French book, not\textit{hing} but a diffuse re-shuffling of the everlasting old stock. In Germany on the contrary there are \textit{for us}, and (I imagine) being produced all the while new \textit{ideas}. Reading of the revival or rather the birth of German literature, Kant, Schiller, Goethe, Jacobi, Fichte, Schelling, Schlegels, Tieck, Richter, Herder, Steffens, W. Humboldt, and a number of others, puts one into a real classical period. These men are interesting as \textit{men}, each standing as a type or representative of a certain way of taking life, and beginning at the bottom—taking nothing for granted.” For a German reader of James, the frequent and quite appropriate insertions of German words, phrases and even stanzas of poetry in his texts never cease to amaze.


17 Gura 2007, Toward the Genteel Tradition (297-306). Stressing another father-son sequence in the gradual transformation of American religious thought, that of Nathaniel Langdon Frothingham (1793-1870) and Octavius Brooks Frothingham (1822-1895), with the son becoming the historian of the movement and its prophet of a new “religion of humanity” (299, 301), Gura completes his magisterial survey by turning to George Santayana (1863-1952) and William James (305). And it is James who, for this reader of Gura’s conclusion, plays a major role in the final chapter of the movement. “If truth is,” Gura concludes, “what an individual finds congruent with his experience rather than a deeply shared social ideal, individualism triumphs, as it did in the Gilded Age and beyond. This was the Transcendentalists’ lasting legacy, for better or worse. They were, if nothing else, great optimists” (306). Chief among them, one might add, even if in a latter-day role with his optimism rooted in the “varieties of religious experience,” was William James.

18 Richardson, 364-365: Writing to Henry Rankin, a Massachusetts librarian, as he sent off the ms of his \textit{The Will to Believe} to the publisher in June of 1896, James exclaimed: “I shall work out my destiny; and possibly as a mediator between scientific agnosticism and the religious view of the world (Christian or not) I may be more useful than if I were myself a positive Christian.”

James, 1992, *The Will to Believe*, 447-452, 449. The first four essays were entitled: 1) “The Will to Believe” (1896, 457-479); 2) “Is Life Worth Living?” (1895, 480-503); 3) “The Sentiment of Rationality” (1879/80, 504-539); 4) “Reflex Action and Theism. (1881, 540-565).


*FA* 9/1, 831: “[...] werden diese Adern des Christentums, Glaube, Liebe, Hoffnung, und ihre Wurzel echte Gewissenhaftigkeit die einzige und innige Menschenreligion bleiben;” 833: Alle diese Wissenschaften müssen zuletzt freilich auf Religion, d.i. auf ein innigstes menschliches Bewußtsein zurückkommen.”

James 1987, 448-449. “Individuality is founded on feeling; and the recesses of feeling, the darker, blinder strata of character, are the only places in the world in which we catch real fact in the making, and directly perceive how events happen and how work is actually done.” For Herder see his “Zum Sinn des Gefühls” in Proß, *Werke* II, 241-250, 884-885, 984-981.


Fechner 1906; Richardson, 458, 498-503; also Gale in Putnam 1997, 60-63. Gale’s thought-provoking arguments about Fechner’s impact on James’s spiritual side merit close attention.

See footnote 21.